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John R. Nolon and Kristen M. Grzan*
Rising Tides-Changing Title:
Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment
Introduction—The Walton County Case
The U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the case
of Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc.1 In
Walton County, the Florida Supreme Court interpreted a
state statute and Florida common law so that the boundary
of some coastal parcels is changed. The statute aects lots
that front on seriously eroded beaches when the state
undertakes a project to restore damaged beach through
renourishment. The eect of the statute is to x the seaward
boundaries of these parcels at a recorded Erosion Control
Line, rather that to allow them to move over time to accom-
modate gradual accretion and erosion.
Some of the aected parcel owners in Walton County,
where a beach renourishment project took place under the
statute, challenged this holding as a regulatory taking and
as a “judicial taking.” They claim that the decision of the
Florida Supreme Court, which held that, on its face, the
statute did not constitute a regulatory taking, reinterpreted
Florida common law simply as a pretext for upholding the
statute. The case raises both novel legal and environmental
issues and illustrates the importance of understanding prop-
erty rights and land titles in reading regulatory takings
cases. It also presents interesting questions of deed drafting
and title insurance.
This article rst discusses the facts of the Walton County
case and how the statute aects title to coastal parcels and
then turns to an analysis of the fee simple absolute title to
coastal properties in Florida, how deeds are drawn, and how
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title is insured under title company practices. This is fol-
lowed by a further exploration of the regulatory taking issue
and then the judicial taking claim. We then explore the ten-
sion that the judicial takings issue raises regarding the ju-
risdiction of federal and state courts. The article then takes
a look at the property interests—the sticks in the bundle of
rights that constitute fee simple title—that are implicated in
regulatory takings cases, followed by a conclusion.
U.S. Supreme Court Grants Certiorari in Walton: The
Facts and the Aect on Title
The setting for the Walton County case is a ve mile
stretch of beach along the Florida panhandle that was criti-
cally eroded by several hurricanes. Much of the land adjacent
to the beach is zoned for a variety of “pro-tourist” uses and is
developed as high rise hotels, mid-rise condominiums and
commercial properties, and a variety of lower density retail,
tourist, and residential uses. Beach related tourism in
Walton County accounts for over $250,000,000 in annual
revenue and is a major reason for the government's commit-
ment to rebuilding beaches when storm surges and hur-
ricanes severely erode them. Some parts of the beach nearly
disappeared after hurricane Opal; others were signicantly
narrowed, aecting the lands owned by private owners as
well as the access that the public, including tourists, have to
walk up and down the beach, sun bathe, and swim.
A variety of state grants, tax surpluses, bonds supported
by future tax revenue, and other funds were accumulated by
the Walton County Tourist Development Council. Altogether
$16 million was raised to cover the cost of beach
renourishment. The funds paid the costs of the beach rebuild-
ing project, which under Florida law requires two permits,
detailed property surveys, and guarantees the protection of
property rights as renourishment progresses. The plaintis
objected to the prospect of rebuilding, argued against the is-
suance of the required permits at administrative hearings
conducted by the Florida Department of Environmental
Protection, and then challenged the statute in court as a
taking under the Florida Constitution. They won at the
District Court level in Florida, but lost when the Florida
Supreme Court reversed.
The Beach and Shore Preservation Act was adopted by the
state legislature in 19612 to discharge the state's duty under
the Florida Constitution to protect natural resources,3 includ-
ing coastal beaches. Under the public trust doctrine,4 the
state owns legal title of the beach seaward of the Mean High
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Water Line (MHWL), which it holds on behalf of the public.
Nearly 400 miles of Florida's 1,200 miles of shoreline in
Florida are listed as “critically eroded” and in need of resto-
ration under the Act, including the ve miles in question in
Walton County.
The Act authorizes state-sponsored renourishment proj-
ects and commits the state to maintain beaches restored and
expanded by such projects. But for such projects, property
owners gamble on the wiles of nature, accepting the risk of
losing title to their land through erosion and gaining it
through accretion: the gradual building up of the beach
seaward of their property lines. Erosion and accretion occur
gradually and unpredictably. As they transpire over the
years, common law holds that the MHWL is moved landward
or seaward, and the boundary between public and private
ownership shifts. When storm events occur and the land is
suddenly altered, the law provides that the boundary be-
tween state and upland ownership is not changed. This is
called avulsion. The doctrine allows both the state and the
private owners aected by sudden shifts in coastal land
formation to take action to reclaim the land moved by
avulsion. Case law in Florida clearly denes hurricanes as
avulsive events.
The Supreme Court of Florida begins its opinion in Walton
County by noting that prior court decisions have not dealt
with many of the common law property right issues raised
by beach renourishment. Curiously, this seems to be the sit-
uation in other prominent coastal states, including Califor-
nia and New York: the common law of littoral, sometimes
called riparian, rights is poorly developed, despite the criti-
cal importance of coastal protection and property rights. The
court also notes that it reviews matters of law of this type de
novo and must be the arbiter of property law, giving defer-
ence to the legislature and presuming the constitutionality
of its actions where possible. This is particularly so here,
since the court treats the plaintis' challenge as a facial at-
tack on the statute where it has to be shown that there ex-
ists no set of circumstances under which the statute would
be valid.
Fixing the Boundary of the Riparian Parcel: The
Legal Impact of the Florida Statute
Under Florida common law, the defendants own title
landward of the MHWL, while the state owns, in public
trust, the land seaward of that line. The line between the
two ownership interests is adjusted automatically every 19
years as tides change following historically predictable cycles
Real Estate Law Journal [Vol. 38:3 2009]
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that inuence the tides.5 Littoral owners also own corollary
rights including the rights of accretion, access to the water,
use of the water, and an unobstructed view of the water.
These are private property rights that cannot be taken from
upland owners without just compensation.
At rst blush, it is hard to understand why property own-
ers would object to having their beaches improved, widened,
and protected by the State of Florida at the expense of the
tourism industry and the taxpayer. The project substantially
widens the beach, expanding public access by adding, on
average, 100 feet of beach seaward of the pre-project mean
high water line. Constitutional arguments aside, these
private owners object to the increased intensity of use by the
public of the land in front of their properties. Demonstrating
that opposition to the renourishment project was not limited
to the six plaintis involved, an association with 150
members sought, but was denied, standing to sue.
Once a renourishment project is completed under the
Beach and Shore Preservation Act, the statute provides that
the property line is xed at the pre-avulsion mean high wa-
ter line. It denominates this surveyed line the Erosion
Control Line (ECL) and requires it to be recorded on the
land records. This statutory xing of the property line takes
away the risk of future erosion and the right to accretion.
The statute provides, however, that if the state fails to
maintain and protect the restored beach, the property line
reverts to the common law mean high water line.
The plainti's primary claim is that xing—rendering im-
moveable—the property line constitutes a regulatory taking
of a recognized common law property right: the right to
accretion. Normally, if the beach expanded through accre-
tion, that new land would belong to the upland owner. The
statute takes that right away, raising the issue of whether
there exists a common law right to accretion under Florida
law that is aected by the statute, and, if so, whether that
amounts to a taking under the Constitution.
Title Issues and the Walton Case
In Florida, as elsewhere, land parcel owners rely on title
companies and title insurance to determine and insure what
they own. Title is established through an examination of the
public records and thorough inspection of the site. The
burden of conducting a diligent search of all public records,
all applicable laws and regulations, and all physical condi-
tions on the land lies on the buyer in a fee transaction and
the lender in a mortgage transaction. The examiner of the
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title assists in this process by searching the chain of title:
prior deeds, mortgages, leases, grants, deed restrictions and
covenants, judgments, liens, Uniform Commercial Code l-
ings, and any other relevant documents relating to the
premises. Title Insurance is indemnity insurance necessary
to ensure that the title is marketable, meaning it is free
from encumbrances and liens that may have occurred in the
chain of title and there is no other party that can claim
ownership of the premises.
Lands bounded by a watercourse give rise to numerous
title examination considerations. Water is not only subject to
environmental factors such as the ebb and ow of the tide,
which result in ever changing title boundaries, but also
unique issues of land ownership. Title to land under water is
“burdened by federal and state navigational servitudes, the
application of doctrines of public trust, public policy, and
various riparian rights . . . .”6
To understand the complexities involved with examining
title to land under water it is important to review the histori-
cal background. All lands under tidal and navigable water
once originated from the Crown of England; title to those
lands were transferred to the new sovereign states for the
use of the public on July 4, 1776. This underwater land was
subject to the U.S. Constitution, which aorded the United
States the right to “regulate and improve navigation, sher-
ies, etc.”7 In New York, transfer to private individuals and
entities of title to lands under water from the sovereign state
is permitted by N.Y. Public Lands Law § 75 and the use, oc-
cupation, and state jurisdiction of the land are prescribed.
Those who own land adjacent to both surface and coastal
waters in New York are denominated riparian land owners.
The state can convey under water lands to riparian owners
through a Patent or Grant, subject to certain conditions that
protect the state's interest in commercial, recreational, or
conservation uses of the property.
Absent transfer of title by the state to lands under water,
“the owner of the adjacent upland owns only to the mean-
high water mark. This is so even where the deed to the
upland owner bounds his land by tidal navigable waters
limited to ‘where the tide ebbs and ows.’ ’’8 So long as the
change in the geographic location of a boundary line along
the water is “gradual and imperceptible”, the property
boundary continues to move, as it does in Florida, so that
the riparian owner gains and loses title as the ambulatory
boundary moves.9
Real Estate Law Journal [Vol. 38:3 2009]
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Schedule A of the Title Policy contains the legal descrip-
tion of the premises most often described by metes and
bounds; metes are specic distance measurements and
bounds are denite boundary markers. A parcel of land is
described by referencing the abutting lands and describing
each course of a boundary as “running along” the line. In the
case where the boundary line is a body of water, the line
runs along the mean high tide line of the water. Consider,
for example, the following Schedule A description:
All that certain plot, piece or parcel of land, with the buildings
and improvements thereon erected, situate, lying and being in
the Town of X, County of X and State of New York, bounded
and described as follows:
BEGINNING on the corner formed by the intersection of the
southeasterly side of Red Road with the northeasterly side
of Blue Avenue;
RUNNING THENCE North 40 degrees 58 minutes 50
seconds East along the southeasterly side of Red Road
524.62 feet South to the southwesterly side of Green Ave-
nue;
THENCE RUNNING South 51 degrees 33 minutes 30
seconds East along the southwesterly side of Green Avenue
350.00 feet to land formerly of Smith and now or formerly of
Jones;
THENCE RUNNING along said land now or formerly of
Jones, the following three (3) courses and distances:
South 38 degrees 26 minutes 30 seconds West 30,00
feet;
South 14 degrees 35 minutes 10 seconds East 154.43
feet;
South 38 degrees 26 minutes 50 seconds West 24.91 feet
to a point;
THENCE still along said lands of Jones and continuing
along lands now or formerly of Doe and part of the way along
a wall, South 51 degrees 35 minutes 00 seconds East 397.34
feet;
THENCE along the southeasterly and southwesterly faces
of the sea wall the following ve (5) courses and distances:
South 40 degrees 25 minutes 00 seconds West 48.51
feet;
South 37 degrees 54 minutes 00 seconds West 43.49
feet;
North 51 degrees 26 minutes 00 seconds West 19.00
feet;
North 34 degrees 29 minutes 00 seconds East 2.17 feet;
and
North 50 degrees 31 minutes 00 seconds West 43.01 feet
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to the line of mean high tide as it existed September 30,
1970;
THENCE along said line of mean high tide as it existed on
September 30, 1970 the following six (6) courses and
distances:
South 34 degrees 46 minutes 00 seconds West 74.06
feet;
South 22 degrees 58 minutes 00 seconds West 49.25
feet;
South 13 degrees 00 minutes 00 seconds West 53.37
feet;
South 28 degrees 18 minutes 00 seconds East 29.53 feet;
South 24 degrees 59 minutes 00 seconds West 97.08
feet; and
South 16 degrees 54 minutes 00 seconds West 31.02 feet
to a point;
THENCE RUNNING North 50 degrees 30 minutes 00
seconds West, for most of the way along the northeasterly
side of Blue Avenue, 931.77 feet to the point or place of
BEGINNING.
A grant of land by Patent will include language of this
sort:
TOGETHER with all the right, title and interest of the party
of the rst part in the land below the mean high tide as it
existed on September 30, 1970 and the land under water lay-
ing in front of and adjoining the above described premises as
conveyed by The People of the State of New York to Mr. John
Doe by Letters Patent dated May 23, 1889 and recorded in the
Oce of the Secretary of State in Book 22 of Patents at page
171 and also recorded in the Oce of the Clerk of the County
of X on June 13, 1889 in Liber Y cp. 100.
If a body of water can be used for trade and commerce, it
is considered to be navigable. “In New York, waters deemed
navigable include the arms of the Atlantic Ocean aected by
the tide, the great rivers such as the St. Lawrence and
Hudson and the larger lakes such as Erie, Ontario, George,
Champlain and the Finger Lakes . . . .”10 Regardless of
whether the state has conveyed title to lands under a navi-
gable body of water to the riparian owner or has kept the
land in trust for the public use, “the federal government,
under the powers granted to Congress to regulate commerce,
may regulate and improve navigation and navigable water,”
often referred to as a federal navigational servitude.11 It is
under this power that the federal government may “require
that the lands be restored to usability for commerce and
navigation without any obligation to pay compensation to
Real Estate Law Journal [Vol. 38:3 2009]
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the owner.”12 Under the regulatory power of the federal
government aorded by the Constitution, regardless of whom
title may vest in, state or upland owner, the rights of said
owners are subordinate to the interest of the people under
the public trust. An exercise of this power by Congress may
be to establish bulkhead lines, pierhead lines, or other
improvement in service of the public. “The authority of the
state to authorize or permit obstructions is subordinate to
the federal power.”13 The Army Corps of Engineers maintains
control of the navigation over all United States waters. It
has the authority to “sanction excavations and lling of lands
under water, remove obstructions to navigation and estab-
lish pierhead and bulkhead lines.”14 There is no obligation by
the federal government to compensate the owner, whether it
is the state or private ownership, for such activities on or
adjacent to their land.
In New York, when insuring property that adjoins such
navigable waters, title companies use four basic “water
exceptions” to their insurance of title:
1. No title is insured to any land lying below the present
or any former high water line of (insert name of body of
water). Under the public trust doctrine, lands under naviga-
ble waters are considered public highways, title to which
vests in the state in trust for the people and therefore, title
should not be insured to any land that is below the current
or former high water line.15
2. Title coverage excepts riparian rights and easements of
others over (insert name of body of water), but policy does
not insure any riparian rights in favor of the owner of the
premises described herein.16
Riparian owners have a right to reasonable use of the wa-
ter abutting their property; these rights, however, are not
insured in the title policy “due to the litigious nature of ri-
parian use.” Title insurance does not cover use of the water
and, therefore, loss of the usage of the water cannot be
brought as a title claim against the insurer.17
3. Title coverage also excepts the right of the United
States Government to change and alter the harbor, bulkhead
or pierhead lines adjacent to said premises, to establish
harbor, bulkhead or pierhead lines dierent from the pres-
ent lines, and to take land now or formerly underwater
without compensation. Under the federal navigational
servitude, the federal government possesses “the power to
regulate commerce, regulate and improve navigation and
navigable waters.”18 This power exists regardless of whether
Zoning and Land Use Planning
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the title to the land now or formerly under the water is held
by the state or the individual owners.
4. Finally, title insurance policies except from coverage
the rights of the United States Government, the State of
New York and local municipalities or any of their depart-
ments or agencies to regulate and control the use of the piers,
bulkheads, land under water and land adjacent thereto. The
federal, state and local governments possess authority to
regulate the use of land under federal and state constitu-
tions and laws adopted under those constitutional provisions.
The risk of limitations on the use of the lands due to such
regulations are on the private parties, not the title company.19
Two of these four exceptions reference that title coverage
excludes any eect on title due to improvements placed on
under water lands under state or federal authority. It is pos-
sible that the increased need for beach restoration and
renourishment activities promulgated by the government
will create the necessity to amend these exceptions to include
explicit mention of them, in addition to physical improve-
ments such as piers and bulkheads.
The State of Florida's land title history is similar to that
of New York. On February 19, 1821, the United States
acquired Florida from Spain including title to all lands lying
under the waters of the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico,
except for those previously conveyed to private parties under
Spanish grants. Title to all submerged sovereignty lands ly-
ing below the MHWL of the Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of
Mexico is vested presently in the Board of Trustees of the
Internal Improvement Trust Fund, consisting of the Gover-
nor and Cabinet.20
When examining title to waterfront properties along the
ocean or gulf coasts in Florida, the determination of what
should be covered and excepted from the policy is dependant
on the legal description of the water boundary line. A stan-
dard water exception reecting the right of sovereignty and
riparian rights is found in nearly every title insurance policy
in Florida. Policies explicitly except “any claim that any part
of said land is owned by the State of Florida by right of
sovereignty, and riparian rights, if any.”21
Where the property description references the meandering
MHWL this standard exception may be omitted. However, if
the water boundary references any xed monument or xed
line, other than the Erosion Control Line, there may be an
overlap with the MHWL and this standard exception must
be included in the policy.22
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Because of accretion and erosion, the boundary line of
some coastal properties may now lie landward of the Mean
High Water Line (MHWL), without any overlap or contact
with the water. Based on the decision of the Florida Supreme
Court in, City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., “the
public has acquired a prescriptive right to the use of the
beachfront areas lying above the MHWL that are custom-
arily private.”23 Accordingly, the following exception must be
included in all policies insuring property fronting on the
Atlantic Ocean or Gulf of Mexico:
“The right, title, or interest, if any, of the public to use any
part of the land seaward and/or lakeward of the most inland of
any of the following: a) the natural line of vegetation; b) the
most extreme highwater line; c) the bulkhead line; and d) any
other line which has been legally established as relating to
such public use.”24
Florida has adopted an Erosion Control Line (ECL) in
some counties where beach restoration and renourishment
activities have been performed. In these cases, the ECL
becomes the boundary between state owned and private
lands. So long as the water boundary line of the insured
land coincides with the ECL, the standard exception may be
omitted. Should there by an overlap between the ECL and
the water boundary line, the standard exception will be
replaced with the following exception from title coverage:
“Any claim by the State of Florida to any portion of the insured
land lying seaward of the Erosion Control Line established in
(insert name of the county) records.”25
In all instances where the insured land abuts or is wholly
or partially submerged and it is deemed appropriate to omit
or to replace the standard water exception in the policy, title
policies include the following riparian rights exception:
“The nature, extent and existence of riparian rights are not
insured.”26
In all title policies insuring lands aected by the naviga-
tional servitude the following exception is contained in title
policies issued in Florida:
“Any and all rights of the United States of America over any
lands now or formerly lying under navigable waters, arising
by reason of the authority of the United States of America to
control navigable waters in the interest of navigation and
commerce, and any conditions contained in any permit
authorizing the lling in of such areas.”27
The Army Corps of Engineers is granted permits for vari-
ous beach revitalization and renourishment activities by the
Zoning and Land Use Planning
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federal government. The permit is not a transfer of any prop-
erty rights, merely an allowance to conduct specic activities
upon the sovereignty and littoral lands. When issuing a
policy insuring property that may be aected by a naviga-
tional servitude there will be an exception in the policy for
these rights. It is possible, however, to purchase armative
coverage for any loss experienced as a result of the existence
of the servitude. “The Navigational Servitude Endorsement,
provides armative coverage against losses sustained by
reason of the U.S. Government requiring the removal of
improvements on land which formerly constituted navigable
waters because the improvements constitute an obstruction
of the navigable waterway. This endorsement only applies to
the federal servitude and not other forms of regulatory
control.”28
Of relevance to the eects of the Beach and Shore Preser-
vation Act in Florida and the title issues it raises, the follow-
ing exceptions are commonly used in title policies insuring
the acquisition or nancing of beachfront lands in Florida.
1. “Notwithstanding the legal description in Schedule A,
this policy does not insure against rights of the State of Flor-
ida based on the doctrine of the state's sovereign ownership
of lands lying below the mean high water line of any naviga-
ble or tidally inuenced waters.”29
2. “Rights, if any, of the public to use as a public beach or
recreation area any part of the land lying between the body
of water abutting the subject property and the natural line
of vegetation, blu, extreme high water line, or other appar-
ent boundary line separating the publicly used area from the
upland private area.”30
3. “Notwithstanding the legal description in Schedule A,
this commitment/policy does not insure any portion of the
land lying waterward of the Erosion Control Line.”31
These title policy exceptions and title company policies
make it clear that the risks of xing a new property bound-
ary under the Beach and Shore Preservation Act are
squarely on the private owners and that they are subject to
the rights of the sovereign state of Florida to eect improve-
ments in the interest of beach restoration and to the rights
of the public to use the improved beach.
The Takings Issues in Walton County:
Does the Statute Aect a Regulatory Taking?
The Florida Supreme Court in Walton County notes that
the Beach and Shore Preservation Act preserves several of
Real Estate Law Journal [Vol. 38:3 2009]
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the corollary littoral rights: the right of access, use, and
view, including the right of ingress and egress, after a
renourishment project is completed.32 The lower court held
that the common law rights of accretion and of contact with
the water are taken by the statute.33 The state high court
disagreed. It asserts that the lower court misunderstands
the law of avulsion. Florida common law holds that when
sudden loss or addition of land occurs—an avulsion— the
property line does not move as it does with accretion; it
remains xed at the former mean high water line. Following
such an event, both the state and the upland owner have a
reasonable time to reclaim their lost lands.34 Prior case law
establishes that hurricanes are avulsive events and that the
loss of the sovereign's interest in the beach may be recovered
by self help on the part of the state.35 The court argues that
the statute simply codies the state's common law right to
reclaim storm-ravaged lands by xing the boundary line at
the pre-event mean high water line.36
Although the court recognizes the existence of a common
law right of accretion, it notes that it is a contingent right,
arising out of a rule of convenience and that the reasons for
establishing the common law right of accretion do not apply
to the statute. Florida common law established four reasons
for recognizing the right of accretion; the court looks at each
one and determines that none of them is implicated in the
context of renourishment by the state of beaches seriously
eroded by avulsive events. It goes through each of four
underlying reasons for the doctrine and demonstrates why
each does not apply.37
The Florida Supreme Court further disagrees with the
district court regarding the upland owner's right to contact
with the water. It explains that this right is ancillary to the
owner's right of access, which is preserved by the statute,
quoting its prior decision in Board of Trustees v. Sand Key
Associates: “We have never addressed whether littoral rights
are unconstitutionally taken based solely upon the loss of an
upland owner's direct contact with the water.”38 Citing the
statute's preservation of the right of access, the court
concludes “at least facially, these provisions ensure that the
upland owner's access to the water remains intact. Therefore,
the rationale for the ancillary right to contact is satised.”39
For devotees of regulatory takings doctrine, the Walton
County case is not a Lucas type of case.40 Lucas involves
regulations that leave no economic value to the regulated
properties, so-called “total takings.” In Walton County, there
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is no regulation at issue that takes the economic value of the
parcel owned by the petitioners. Walton County is best
described as a Loretto-style case, a dierent per se category
of takings.41 The case raises the somewhat novel issue of
whether the “appropriation” of a common law property right,
such as the right to accretion, constitutes a compensable
taking. The typical Loretto case involves a challenge to a
governmental action that imposes an armative easement
on private property where there is no application by the af-
fected owner for a governmental permit.
Mrs. Loretto was simply told that she had to grant an
easement to the cable company to allow it to install and
maintain cables for the convenience of her tenants. Even
though the intrusion was de minimis, the Court held that a
taking of her fundamental right of exclusion occurred.
Similarly, the beachfront owners in Walton County are told
that their property lines will be xed by the statute even
though they are not before a public body for a building or
development permit.
The Florida Supreme Court recognizes that a “governmen-
tal appropriation” of a discrete property right, one stick in
the bundle of rights, can constitute a compensable taking.
Walton County refers to Lee County v. Kiesel, a Florida case
that held that riparian owners own a right to an unob-
structed view of the water and that this right was violated
by the construction of a bridge on government lands built at
an angle to the water line that obstructed their view.42 The
court, in Lee, held this to be a compensable taking. The Lee
court cites two prior Florida cases for the proposition. It
then held that the right to a view is not absolute, recogniz-
ing the government's right to obstruct it to a degree, but
notes that the government action must not “substantially
and materially obstruct the land owner's view of the
channel.”43
The Lee court calls this a case by case analysis—a process
of making an “equitable distribution” regarding the sub-
merged lands between the upland and the Channel.44 This
would seem to call for similar exibility with regard to beach
renourishment, rendering the other common law rights of
the littoral owners less than absolute. In this sense, it diers
from the absolutist view of imposing an armative ease-
ment in Loretto under which even the slightest invasion is
compensable.
Does the Florida Supreme Court's Decision
Constitute a “Judicial Taking?”
The plaintis' petition for certiorari claims that the Flor-
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ida Supreme Court “invoked non-existent rules of state
substantive law to reverse 100 years of uniform holdings
that littoral rights are constitutionally protected.”45 They call
this a “judicial taking” and ask the U.S. Supreme Court to
recognize this judicial redenition of extant rights, combined
with the working of the statute to x their property line, as
a compensable taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Over 15 years ago, the Court denied certiorari in a similar
case where beachfront owners argued that an Oregon stat-
ute constituted a taking where it prevented building sea
walls on the “dry sand area” of their beaches. They lost when
the Oregon Supreme Court held that the public had right to
the dry sand area under the “doctrine of custom.”46 Justice
Scalia dissented from the denial of certiorari, writing that
“the petitioners must be aorded an opportunity to make out
their constitutional claim by demonstrating that the asserted
custom is pretextual.”47 Among other statements, Scalia
indicated that the Oregon Supreme Court “appears to have
misread Blackstone in applying the law of custom.”48
Is this the role of the U.S. Supreme Court: to decide the
wisdom or accuracy of a state court's determination of
preexisting state law? Perhaps one of the more interesting
and important issues the Walton County case raises is
whether matters of state common law, as determined by the
highest state court, are reversible by the Court. Scalia thinks
so. “Our opinion in Lucas . . . would be a nullity if anything
that a State court chooses to denominate ‘background law’ —
regardless of whether it is really such — could eliminate
property rights.”49 The Court's Lucas case held that a regula-
tion that takes all economic use of a petitioner's property is
a taking unless, under the “background principles of the
State's law,”50 the use that the regulation prohibits is “not
part of his title to begin with.”51
In Lucas, Scalia, writing for the majority, also referred to
“our traditional resort to ‘existing rules or understandings
that stem from an independent source such as state law’ to
dene the range of interests that qualify for protection as
‘property’ under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”52
In Lucas, the Court stated, “Although it seems unlikely that
common-law principles would have prevented the erection of
any habitable or productive improvements on Lucas's land,
this state-law question must be dealt with on remand.”53 The
Lucas decision also accommodates the notion that change in
common law principles happens. “The fact that a particular
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use has long been engaged in by similarly situated owners
ordinarily imports a lack of any common-law prohibition
though changed circumstances or new knowledge may make
what was previously permissible no longer so.”54
This view, by Scalia, in writing the majority decision in
Lucas is supported by a long line of cases. “A State's highest
court is unquestionably ‘the ultimate expositor of state law,’ ’’
and “the prerogative of (the state court) to say what (the
state's) law is merits respect in federal forums.”55 The Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution denes what a taking
is, but does not dene what property rights are. The U.S.
Supreme Court has resorted to “existing rules or understand-
ings that stem from an independent source such as state
law” in order to dene what constitutes property under the
Fifth Amendment.”56 “[T]he Constitution protects rather than
creates property interests.”57 “Nor as a general proposition is
the United States, as opposed to the several States, pos-
sessed of residual authority that enables it to dene ‘prop-
erty’ in the rst instance.”58 In Phillips Petroleum, the Court
held that “[s]tates have the authority to dene the limits of
lands held in public trust and to recognize private rights in
such lands as they see t.”59 The principle that state substan-
tive property law applies to questions involving sovereignty
lands was armed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Oregon v.
Corvallis.60
Conclusion
Takings cases draw upon the expertise of real estate at-
torneys and their practices in a variety of ways. The chal-
lenge of drafting exceptions to title insurance policies is clear
following this review of title practices in Florida. The
importance of reading and understanding these exceptions
on the part of future purchasers and lenders is equally
obvious. To follow takings cases, one must be conversant
with a wide variety of property rights including, in the
Walton County case alone, armative easements running to
the public, navigational servitudes held by the state and
federal governments, rights to a view, rights of access to the
water, rights to sh and boat, the risk of erosion, the right to
reclaim land after an avulsive event, and the future contin-
gent rights of accretion and contact to the water.
So many constitutional and practical issues are raised by
the Walton County case. Will the Court use the Lucas
concept of a total taking and apply it to the taking of a
discrete stick from the bundle of property rights or will it see
Walton County as a Loretto-style case, but rene Loretto to
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include and explain how it should be used in a government
appropriation case rather than its traditional use in invasion
cases?
Did the Florida Supreme Court reinterpret common law as
a pretext for validating the Beach and Shore Preservation
Act? Is there any clear holding of a previous Florida Supreme
Court decision in the context of beachfront erosion that was
confused, reversed, or misinterpreted by the decision? If
common law shifts gradually, like the mean high water line,
should a “judicial taking” be found when a state court ap-
plies previous common law principles to emerging circum-
stances like coastal erosion in a time of climate change?
What would the U.S. Supreme Court have to nd wrong
with the state court's analysis to justify reversal on the basis
of state common law? By what powers of divination does the
Court determine that a state court decision is motivated by
a pretext?
To underline the seriousness of the issues involved, we
end with a quote from a governmental report from Miami-
Dade County in Florida, which contains the following
prognosis: “Developed Miami-Dade County as we know it
will signicantly change with a 3–4 foot sea level rise. Spring
high tides would be at about +7 to 8 feet; freshwater re-
sources would be gone; the Everglades would be inundated
on the west side of Miami-Dade County; the barrier islands
would be largely inundated; storm surges would be devastat-
ing; landll sites would be exposed to erosion contaminating
marine and coastal environments.”61
The Walton County case implicates the role of state courts
in dening the common law of their unique coastlines and
the state legislature in adjusting to unprecedented changes
in the environment and the eect of those changes on prop-
erty ownership. Who decides these matters and what degree
of latitude they have in making those decisions is clearly a
matter of great importance.
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